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IS FORCING THEM WORTH THE EFFORT? BENEFITS OF MANDATORY 
INTERNSHIPS FOR GRADUATES FROM DIVERSE FAMILY 
BACKGROUNDS AT LABOUR MARKET ENTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Mandatory internships are implemented into higher education curricula in order to 
ease the labour market integration of graduates. This article evaluates the utility of mandatory 
internships in Germany by assessing the effect on graduates’ transition from higher education 
to work. We examine whether these compulsory programs provide extra benefits for 
graduates from families with lower educational background. Three different outcome 
variables are used to characterize the labour market entry: search duration until the first 
significant job, employment history complexity and wages five years after graduation. Our 
results clearly indicate that compulsory internship programs neither have a positive effect on 
labour market outcomes in general nor are they particularly beneficial for graduates from 
lower educational background. 
Key words: Internships, Transition from Education to Work, Job Training Program, Germany 
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Introduction 
Mandatory internships or “sandwich placements” have become a substantial element 
of curricula in Germany’s system of higher education. For instance, a survey among students 
enrolled in higher education in Germany shows that 55% of the respondents took part in an 
internship within the last 12 months. Two thirds of these internships were compulsory (e.g. 
Krawietz, Müßig-Trapp & Willige, 2006) and in all European countries a substantial share of 
students participates in such work placements (Allen, 2007). Practical experience is presumed 
to enhance employability and to ease the entrance into the professional world and, as a result, 
students are instructed to invest time, effort and sometimes even money into work experience 
during their studies. From a policy perspective, it is important to know to what extent the 
introduction of mandatory internships into curricula influences the process of labour market 
integration. Internships present an opportunity cost of either less time for instruction in class 
or a delayed entry into the labour market. Several theories suggest that early labour force 
experience has a positive effect on a smooth transition from higher education to work. Not 
only is it an opportunity to establish social ties with employers and employees but it also 
enables students to learn about the requirements of specific jobs and adapt to a working 
environment. At the same time, employers have the opportunity to “screen” future graduates 
on the basis of everyday performance.  
The implementation of compulsory internship programs may additionally have a 
positive impact on social fluidity. Recent research shows that lower class children tend to 
enrol less often in tertiary education than children from privileged classes (Shavit et al., 
2007). One hypothesis to explain these findings is that upper class children have access to 
more resources that are relevant for a successful educational career (Erikson & Jonsson, 
1996). Beyond these educational disparities social class origin still has a direct impact on 
labour market outcomes (Jackson, Goldthorpe & Mills, 2005). Thus, class-specific differences 
in early labour market success are not only mediated through educational achievement or 
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human capital but also through other mechanisms such as a different availability of cultural or 
social resources (Breen, 1998: 292; Hansen, 2001: 212). Even when they achieve the same 
educational level, children from different class or educational origin arrive at different 
destinations in the labour market. As higher education graduates from lower educational 
backgrounds lack parental social resources, they may have more difficulties in entering the 
labour market than their peers whose parents have greater social networks. The 
implementation of mandatory internships in higher education curricula could be a way to help 
them gaining access to social networks and thus reduce their disadvantages at labour market 
entry. Thus, we examine whether mandatory internships particularly improve the labour 
market integration of graduates from lower educational background. 
Most studies evaluating the impact of internships on labour market entry concentrate 
on voluntary rather than mandatory internships. There are two key reasons to focus on 
compulsory programs. First, the evaluation of mandatory internships is policy relevant and 
has a clear policy implication. In order to assess the policy of forcing students into a “real” 
working environment before graduation one should not refer to the effect of voluntary 
internships. Voluntary internship experiences may differ from mandatory ones e.g. in length 
or by selection effects whereby only the most impressive students participate, who would 
likely have better job opportunities even without the potential benefit an internship might 
provide. Observable or unobservable differences between students lead to our second, more 
methodological, motivation to assess the impact of mandatory programs. If students who 
voluntarily participate in an internship differ from their non-participating peers in certain 
characteristics that are valuable for a successful career-start, the effects found for internships 
on early labour market outcomes are biased. Some studies address these issues with statistical 
controls (Allen & van der Velden, 2007; Fuller & Schoenberger, 1991; Kreuter, 2000; 
Schröder, 2002) while others ignore it and solely examine correlations (Bowes & Harvey, 
1999; Richards, 1984). The fact that mandatory internships are not optional for students in a 
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certain study program considerably ameliorates the problem of selection bias in our analysis. 
Once students have chosen to study in a program that requires participation, selective 
decisions for internships are not possible. We are left with (smaller) problems that stem from 
self-selection of students into certain study programs that offer mandatory internships or not 
and the varying labour market outcomes of these programs. 
In this article we examine the impact of early labour force experience in terms of 
mandatory internships on graduates’ transition from school to work. In order to assess the 
success of labour market integration we look at the duration of job search for the first 
significant employment, the employment stability in the first five years after graduation and 
the hourly wages five years after graduation. The remaining selectivity problems on the level 
of institutions and study programs and on the individual level of selection into programs will 
be addressed by propensity score matching.  
 
The implementation of mandatory internships in the German higher education system 
 
The implementation of mandatory internships varies not only between higher 
education institutions but also between study programs within each institution. Thus, it is not 
the case that a university or Fachhochschule (university of applied sciences) automatically 
introduces compulsory internship for all programs of study. In order to give an illustration of 
typical modes of implementation, we consulted the curricula for the social sciences and 
business/economics described on the homepages of several German universities. In most 
study programs the duration of mandatory internships is at least three months. In some 
second-tier practically oriented Fachhochschulen the duration is six to twelve months. Full 
universities tend to require shorter internships than Fachhochschulen. Often, the student is 
obliged to find an employer him- or herself. Some institutions have arrangements with 
employers or provide an internship manager who places students into internships or gives 
advice.  
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Theoretical background 
Labour market entry and the value of early labour force experience 
Policy-makers and the management of higher education institutions introduce 
mandatory internships into curricula in order to better prepare students for the “real” world of 
work (Ryan, Toohey & Hughes, 1996). From an academic perspective, several theoretical 
arguments indeed suggest positive effects of early work experience such as mandatory 
internships on the transition from higher education to work. One argument is that graduates 
who complete an internship acquire occupation-specific skills that are related to their field of 
study (Sarcletti, 2007; Scholz, Steiner & Hansmann, 2004). This raises their productivity level 
in future jobs being directly rewarded by employers with higher wages. Similar, one could 
propose that work experience before graduation equips students with specific forms of 
cultural capital. Beyond learning how to perform better and more efficient on a job, interns 
also acquire cultural codes and get used to specific manners or soft skills that are prevailing in 
the social environment of a certain industry sector, company, or occupation. Most of these 
skills are not communicated in the educational system (Jackson et al., 2005) and must be 
experienced elsewhere (home environment, on-the-job). 
Whereas student involvement in the workplace enables employers to screen potential 
employees (Stiglitz, 1975), this also enables students to screen potential working 
environments and job opportunities. Prospective employers may also value letters of 
recommendation, commonly issued at the end of jobs or internships, as signals for graduates’ 
potential productivity (Spence, 1973). Hence, doing an internship should facilitate a faster and 
smoother match between employer and employee as it increases the knowledge about the 
contracting partner on both sides (Sørensen & Kalleberg, 1981). In an experimental 
simulation Taylor (1988) found that students with an internship experience are evaluated as 
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being significantly more qualified and hence have a higher probability of being hired than 
students without internships. 
In addition, social networking with potential employers and employees may facilitate 
students’ job search process after graduation (Granovetter, 1974). Internships provide a bridge 
experience to ease the transition between “student” and “employee” status. By allowing 
student to shift contexts from the classroom to the workplace students are able to gain access 
to informal networks with highly valuable resources for the future job search process. Several 
studies on firms’ hiring behaviour come to the conclusion that applicants being referred by 
current employees have a higher probability of being hired than non-referrals (Fernandez, 
Castilla & Moore, 2000; Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997; Petersen, Saporta & Seidel, 2000). As 
people in business networks not only share information about job vacancies but also many 
aspects of job quality such as wages, promotion prospects or working conditions, the 
enhanced social capital should reduce the job search duration and improve the match between 
a graduate and his or her first significant job.  
In summary, most theoretical considerations discussed here consistently expect that 
(mandatory) internships before graduation will ease the transition from higher education to 
work.  
Social origin and labour market entry 
Beyond a general impact of mandatory internships we ask if these benefits are 
particularly important for students from families with lower parental educational attainment. 
While most of the aforementioned advantages are expected to be enhanced by internship 
experiences they are also assumed to be distributed unequally across different social 
backgrounds. In our sample, however, the students are homogenous with regard to formal 
educational achievement. Thus, as long as we assume that skills are acquired through formal 
education, there should be no differences between students with higher and lower educational 
background in the amount of occupation-specific skills. However, it is plausible that students 
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coming from higher educated families use parental social capital more often to partake in 
(advantageous) voluntary internships. This circumstance might result in an advance in job-
specific skills. 
Parental education, occupation or class should rather shape the distribution of cultural 
capital. In particular, if students from more privileged family backgrounds enter the same 
occupations as their parents (Jonsson et al., 2009), they may benefit from parental knowledge 
about occupation-specific cultural and behavioural codes even before entering their studies. In 
contrast, students from families with lower parental educational attainment have to rely on 
later experiences. Internship programs during studies may give them the opportunity to 
overcome this disadvantage. 
With regard to social capital it is very plausible that disparities between social 
background groups exist. It can be expected that parental social capital beneficial on the 
labour market for tertiary graduates is more easily available in higher educated families (Burt, 
1983; Lin, Ensel & Vaughn, 1981). In fact, differences in social capital are assumed to be one 
of the reasons that lower class children invest less in higher education than upper class 
children (Erikson & Jonsson, 1996: 30). Thus, one can assume that in particular students from 
lower educational background benefit from the acquisition of their “own” social capital 
through mandatory internships.  
All in all, the social capital perspective suggests that mandatory internships are more 
beneficial for graduates coming from less educated families and thus lead to an amelioration 
of disadvantages from social origin. 
 
Operationalisation of the labour market entry 
We operationalise the labour market integration process using three different 
outcomes that capture different aspects of labour market success: duration of job search 
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before the first significant employment spell, the “complexity” of labour market careers 
during the first five years after graduation and log hourly wages five years after graduation. 
Job search duration is often seen as an indicator for a successful and smooth transition 
from school to work (Teichler, 2000: 12). The search time is measured as the period between 
the month of final degree attainment and the beginning month of the first reported significant 
employment spell. A job is defined as significant if an individual’s early work biography 
displays “dependent employment” for the first time. We took care to distinguish these 
employment spells from short-term stop-gap jobs and marginal employments (all kinds of 
minor or casual work such as summer jobs or internships). Whereas the episodes 
“unemployed”, “freelance work”, “to job”, “internship”, “advanced training” and “family 
work” are counted as search time, “miscellaneous” or “parental leave” are not considered as 
active search time and therefore not counted as such. There are 47 cases which do enter any 
job throughout the whole observation period. Excluding them from our analysis does not 
change the results. 
Complexity of employment history in the first five years after graduation represents an 
indicator for the quality of the matching between the job and the applicant. The risk of a job 
mismatch is particularly high for recent graduates as employers only have few signals that 
indicate the prospective performance of the applicant and graduates lack sufficient 
information about employers and job characteristics (Wolbers, 2003). As outlined in our 
theoretical discussion, early work experience may improve the match between employer and 
employee in the first significant job and thus leads to more stability in the early labour market 
career. We measure the complexity of the transition from higher education to work as 
suggested by Elzinga (in press). A more comprehensive discussion of methodological options 
is also found in a recent working paper of Aisenbrey and Fasang (2009). In this framework 
labour market careers are seen as sequences of distinct activities or states, such as 
“employment” or “unemployment”. Each of these sequences can be divided into different 
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sub-sequences. Sub-sequences are sequence patterns describing parts of the labour market 
career. Consider for example a sequence of “internship”-“unemployment”-“employed”, then 
“unemployed”-“employed” is a possible sub-sequence. The criterion for complexity of a 
career is the logarithm to the basis 2 of the number of distinct sub-sequences. The complete 
sequence of labour market statuses is divided into all possible sub-sequences that are 
contained in it. The more different activities a career involves and the more transitions 
between activities occur, the more sub-sequences can be found. Beyond that, this measure 
also captures the number of transitions between two identical activities. If identical activities 
are “located” closer to each other in the career, this reduces the number of possible sub-
sequences. The logarithm is chosen as a more preferable scale for practical research than the 
original number of sub-sequences following the suggestion of Elzinga (in press). In fact, as 
we distinguish many different states, the number of sub-sequences inflates and would create 
very large numbers if we would not adopt this practice. If two states are parallel, we must 
define one of them as the dominant activity. Therefore we introduced the following 
hierarchical order: “in higher education” > “employed” > “self employed” > “internship” > 
“unemployed” > “dissertation” > “minor work” > “housework/family” > “further education” 
> “miscellaneous”. For example, a person who reenrols into university is counted as student, 
even if he/she follows a side job, since studying takes a higher position in our dominance 
structure.  
The logarithm of the hourly wage is used as a measure of job quality: Beyond finding 
a job at all, the quality of the achieved job might differ substantially. Again, we assume that a 
better match between applicant and job increases the productivity and subsequently the salary 
of the graduates (Garcia-Espejo & Ibánez, 2006; van de Werfhorst, 2002). The logarithm is 
used for two reasons. First, differences between high wages that are large in absolute terms 
but substantively meaningless are weighted as less important than the same differences 
between lower wages. For instance, a difference of €500.00 is a substantive difference for 
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low-wage earners, but not for the highest 5% of the wage distribution. Second, it makes our 
measure less susceptible to outliers. As entry-level jobs in a company rarely mirror the quality 
of the position in pay, we use the gross wage five years after graduation as a long term 
indicator, additionally including annual bonuses.  
 
Data and methods 
For the purpose of this study, we consider a cohort of graduates from higher education 
in Germany, surveyed in the HIS (Hochschul-Informations-System) Graduate Panel 1997 
(Fabian & Minks, 2006). 6216 respondents were asked in a mail survey one and five years 
after graduation and reported their full employment history for the first five years. Graduates 
of fields that acquire a “Staatsexamen”-degree, which is the standardized government-
recognized degree for medical doctors, veterinaries, clerics, lawyers, pharmacists and teachers 
throughout Germany, usually do not compete directly on the labour market. Their curricula 
include a traineeship phase (similar to mandatory internships) after graduation for all students 
and in all study programs in Germany and at the same time institutionalized arrangements for 
the transition into work. This parallel occurrence of traineeships and government organized 
transition to work could easily bias our analyses, therefore we exclude these cases. Moreover, 
we exclude fields of study that mainly or fully lack variation in the implementation of 
mandatory internships across higher education institutions. Counterfactual analysis requires a 
substantial degree of randomness in order to have people with identical characteristics 
observed in both treatment and control state (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008: 38). Specifically, 
those fields where 85% or more of the graduate sample within a field complete mandatory 
internships were excluded. A detailed description of included fields of study is given in table 
1. Small changes in the threshold level do not alter the results. Overall, this reduces our 
sample to 2594 cases.  
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Table 1 about here 
 
In observational studies the estimator for the effect of internships could be biased due 
to a non-random assignment of students to those participating and those not participating in 
internship experiences. By using compulsory internships instead of voluntary ones we 
substantially reduce the number of potential confounding factors, as students are not able to 
self-select into participation once enrolled in a certain program. However, it is still possible 
that there is self-selection into different fields of study or higher education institutions which 
require more or less compulsory internships. Thus, students who participate in mandatory 
internships may not be similar on average to those not participating. In order to take this into 
account and approach an estimation of the unbiased effect of mandatory internships on our 
three outcomes, we use the propensity score matching-technique (PSM, Leuven & Sianesi, 
2003; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Here we match cases on characteristics of the study 
program and on individual characteristics that could potentially select certain students into 
different study programs. To ensure the comparability between graduates that are used for 
matching, we estimate propensity scores measuring the propensity to partake in study 
programs encompassing a mandatory internship. In our case this assignment model is 
estimated using a logistic regression model. Technically, the propensity score is defined as the 
probability of participating in a mandatory internship, conditional on students´ characteristics 
before enrolling (cf. Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). In a second step we match graduates with 
and without mandatory internship based on the propensity score using the Kernel Matching 
Method (Heckman, Ichimura & Todd, 1998). This method matches each individual with 
mandatory internship to the weighted average of all those individuals who could decide 
themselves about participation in an internship. A major advantage of this approach compared 
to other matching methods is a higher precision of the estimates as more information is used. 
However, the estimation might be more susceptible to bias due to the possible usage of bad 
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matches. As the choice of a matching estimator is to some degree arbitrary, we replicated our 
results using “Nearest-Neighbor”-, “Radius”- and “Stratified” Matching (Becker & Ichino, 
2002). None of the matching algorithms changed the substantive conclusion of our findings. 
Therefore, we only report the results of the kernel matching. According to a test suggested by 
Becker and Ichino (2002) our assignment models satisfy the balancing property. The 
balancing property is satisfied if the background characteristics of the individuals with 
mandatory internships are properly adjusted to the ones without. The criterion for a significant 
violation of the balancing hypothesis was set to the level 0.001. 
For the analysis stratified by parental education, we distinguish between high and low 
educational background. The “high”-category contains all graduates who have at least one 
parent with a tertiary degree, all other graduates are classified into the “low”-category. 
 
Results 
First, we estimate the propensity score in a binary regression model with “having 
mandatory internship” as the dependent variable. Our assignment models use a rich set of 
variables that are either related to the characteristics of study programs or to characteristics of 
individuals that influence their choice of study programs. Most importantly, we include the 
field of study, type of institution (first tier universities vs. second tier Fachhochschulen) and 
characteristics of the study environment as well as the federal state of the institution in the 
estimation. Although particularly in the pre-Bologna-era the German university system was 
highly standardized, where no elite universities exist, we control for items (self-assessment of 
students) such as degree of structuring or how up-to-date the acquired methods are to take 
account of potential differences in the quality of institutions and study programs that may 
influence the propensity of introducing mandatory internships and the labour market 
outcomes at the same time. We argue that this captures the variation in the implementation of 
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mandatory internships between fields and institutional settings and their independent effects 
on labour market outcomes well. An exemplary assignment model is given in table 2.  
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
For each outcome we have three assignment models covering the full model and the 
models stratified by educational background. Thus, overall we have nine assignment models. 
Due to space restrictions, the other eight assignment models are available in an online-
appendix at http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/misc/appendix_kleinweiss.pdf. 
We assume that the introduction of mandatory internships into curricula within a certain study 
program is arbitrary and rather unrelated to other (unobserved) characteristics that are relevant 
for the successful integration into the labour market. Additionally, we propose that individual 
decisions to opt for a certain study program do not directly depend on the availability of 
mandatory internships. Instead of choosing a study program with mandatory internship 
students can easily choose to study in a different program and partake in a voluntary 
internship. Therefore, we argue that our assignment models indeed guarantee to a high degree 
that individuals with and without mandatory internship are similar.  
First, we compare the unmatched means for each outcome variable of participants and 
non-participants in mandatory internships. Second, we report the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) based on the matched propensity scores. Table 1 shows both values for the 
three outcome variables job search duration, complexity of the employment career and log 
hourly wages.  
Starting with the impact of mandatory internships on the job search duration, we find a 
search time bonus of 1.4 months for participants under the unmatched condition. A t-value of 
-3.43 indicates that this difference is statistically significant at conventional criteria. However, 
comparing individuals with and without mandatory internship under the matched condition, 
 14 
the group difference (ATT) is close to zero. Further, it is not statistically significant as 
indicated by the respective z-value. Thus, completing a mandatory internship seems to have 
no benefit with regard to job search duration. The same pattern can be seen for our second 
outcome “complexity” of employment history: a significant advantage in employment 
stability for graduates with mandatory internships in comparison to the ones without is not 
confirmed under the matching condition. Thus, effects of mandatory internships are zero 
when controlling confounding factors. In the case of hourly wages five years after graduation, 
we do not even find group differences under the unmatched condition. If any, there is on 
average even a slight punishment in monetary returns for individuals completing mandatory 
internships.  
For all three indicators of a “smooth” transition into the labour market the impact of 
mandatory internships is only present as long as we do not account for heterogeneity between 
individuals with and without mandatory internship. The apparent bias under the unmatched 
condition is explained by matching treated and untreated graduates being as similar as 
possible. Thus, we do not find a positive effect of the participation in mandatory internship 
programs on the labour market integration of tertiary graduates. 
 
Table 3 about here. 
 
As the field of study has a strong impact on the treatment in the assignment model, it 
might be better to perform the matching separately (or stratified) by field of study (Heckman, 
Ichimura & Todd, 1997). Due to small sample sizes we are unable to split our sample to fields 
on a very detailed level so we applied a stratified matching to four broader field groups: 
“Business and Economics”, “Technical fields and Agriculture”, “Sciences and Mathematics” 
and “Arts and Social Sciences”. As the field-specific effects do not differ substantially from 
 15 
the overall group difference (ATT), the stratified matching does not alter our evaluation of 
mandatory internships. 
Our second hypothesis proposed that graduates with parents that did not attend 
university benefit disproportionately from mandatory internships than those with parents who 
did. In order to test this, table 1 additionally indicates the unmatched and matched differences 
between graduates with and without mandatory internships separately by parental educational 
attainment. For both groups of educational background the unmatched differences between 
participants and non-participants are nearly identical with the overall differences. The ATT 
for compulsory internship programs shows no significant difference under both conditions 
whatever degree the parents have.  
Under the matched condition graduates from lower educational background with 
mandatory internships still have a slightly but not significantly shorter search time (0.26 
months less) than their peers without mandatory internships. Among students with higher 
educational background the ones with mandatory internships even search longer (0.25 months 
more) than the ones without. Although the effects are in the assumed direction, the non-
significant effects do not support our second hypothesis.  
The same pattern applies to complexity of work history. While graduates from a 
higher educational background in the mandatory internship group have more complex 
employment patterns than graduates from the same background but without this internship, 
there remains a small positive effect of mandatory internships on job stability for graduates 
from less educated families under the matched condition. However, the analytic z-value of -
0.57 indicates that the effect of mandatory internships is not significant for graduates from 
lower educational background. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not supported with regard to this 
outcome as well. 
Regarding the log hourly wages, we find a negative ATT of mandatory internships for 
both graduates with and without academic parents. While this negative effect is close to zero 
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for graduates from higher educational background under the matched condition, a remarkable 
but not significant negative ATT of 6.3% lower wages for graduates with low educational 
background prevails. 
To sum up, there is no evidence for either hypothesis: Neither can mandatory 
internships ease the transition from higher education to work on average, nor do they prove to 
be particularly helpful for students from less educated families in mediating disproportionate 
benefits from familial social networks or cultural capital. However, the rejection of our 
second hypothesis does not rule out theories that expect lower class families to have a less 
smooth transition from higher education to work due to lack in beneficial resources. Hence, 
the implementation of mandatory internships is not able to mitigate family background effects 
on labour market outcomes. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
At the outset of this article we introduced two different research objectives, both 
regarding the implementation of compulsory internships in tertiary curricula. First, we 
intended to test theories that claim early work experience to have a beneficial effect on the 
labour market integration of tertiary graduates. Our second purpose was to evaluate the 
practical utility of introducing mandatory internships into higher education curricula and its 
implication for policy makers. Beyond that we were interested in the question whether 
particularly graduates from families with lower parental educational attainment benefit from 
mandatory internships. In order to measure the smoothness of the transition from higher 
education to work we considered three different aspects: the job search duration for the first 
significant job, the “complexity” of the employment career and log hourly wages five years 
after graduation. We estimated outcome differences between students who were obliged to 
participate in internships and those who were free in their choice. Accounting for observed 
differences between students in programs with and without compulsory internship we 
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corrected the estimation of treatment effects using propensity score matching. Moreover, the 
use of mandatory internships that force all students in a certain study program at a certain 
institution to partake in an internship enables us to reduce biased effects due to unobserved 
heterogeneity in ability or motivation. 
Our results are clear-cut with regard to policy evaluation. Even though the literature 
provides evidence for beneficial effects of internships in general, we do not find an effect of 
compulsory internship programs on labour market outcomes. Furthermore, we do not find any 
evidence that these programs are useful to ameliorate disadvantages in labour market 
integration for graduates from lower educational background. Therefore, the value of 
compulsory internship programs is clearly called into question. One possible explanation for 
our findings would be to reject the proposed theoretical mechanisms themselves. This would 
be in strong contradiction for instance to findings on the impact of social capital on labour 
market outcomes in general (Flap & Boxman, 2001). There might be different reasons for this 
contradiction between our findings and previous research on voluntary internships or other 
early labour force experience.  
First, one could argue that students lack motivation when being obliged to do an 
internship. The compulsory nature of these internships may lead to lower job performance and 
consequently to a smaller gain in occupation-specific skills throughout their work experience. 
Research in social psychology showed that the introduction of extrinsic motivation can reduce 
intrinsic motivation (Deci & Moller, 2005) and hence students could be less motivated to 
learn and to take an active role in the internship. While voluntary internships can be regarded 
at least to some degree as intrinsically motivated, making it a compulsory requirement clearly 
introduces extrinsic motivation. 
Second, internships do not automatically have positive effects for all students. Only 
interns with high abilities may acquire sufficient job-specific knowledge and gain access to 
additional resources, whereas their less able peers may even be negatively evaluated by 
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employers. On average, these positive and negative impacts might cancel each other out and 
finally result in the fact that committing all students to complete an internship programs does 
not proof to be beneficial.  
Third, from the perspective of signalling theory (Spence, 1973), mandatory internships 
may not work as meaningful signals in addition to other signals on the labour market and 
therefore employers do not rely on them. This may be due to the fact that their signalling 
value is blurred by high participation rates of students in voluntary internships or other early 
work experiences. 
Fourth, it seems plausible that only students who are motivated or highly able select 
into voluntary internships. This problem is commonly called “selection problem in the social 
sciences” (Manski, 1995). Due to their characteristics these graduates would be successful on 
the labour market even without participating in an internship. Thus, the absence of an effect of 
mandatory internships may indicate that the positive impact of voluntary ones or other field-
specific work experience (e.g. Franzen & Hecken, 2002: 746) on later career outcomes may 
possibly appear due to unobserved heterogeneity in ability, motivation or effort of students.  
Fifth, another reason for differences in the impact of mandatory and voluntary 
internships could be that mandatory programs are not capable to provide graduates with 
additional resources that are theoretically expected and help to ease the transition into work. 
As the length of mandatory programs is set by the school, their low value could be due to the 
shorter duration in comparison to voluntary programs. A disadvantage of our study is that we 
only know whether graduates were required to do an internship or not. Hence, we neither have 
information on the search process for compulsory internships nor about the content and 
duration of these programs. Limiting the examination to those who participated in mandatory 
internships for a length of six months and more could possibly change the results in a more 
beneficial direction. Concerning practical relevance, our general conclusion that the current 
implementation misses the target of imparting better employability is not affected.  
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Given the advantageous setting for “causal” analysis we intended to provide strong 
evidence for common assumptions from social science theories. However, these theoretical 
considerations turned out not to be predictive in the case of completing an internship. To 
summarize, we suggest that this is not due to the fact that the theories are wrong. In our 
opinion, the reason is that the mandatory nature of the internship may cancel out potential 
benefits. 
As a methodological note, we want to stress the importance of field of study (see table 
2) as confounding factor, which has to be taken into account when examining the effect of 
internships or other additional qualifications on labour market integration. Much of the effect 
of mandatory internships is explained by this variable and their independent effect on the 
transition from school to work. Hence, future studies that assess the effect of school-to-work 
programs, internships or any other kind of work experience before graduation are strongly 
advised to consider the horizontal dimension of educational stratification.  
Consequently, one could also argue that the “success” of mandatory internships in 
enhancing employability depends on the existence of occupation-specific school to work 
channels. In liberal arts programs without an institutional link to concrete occupations (e.g. 
the German Magister Artium), the implementation of mandatory internships may be more 
beneficial than in fields with more established channels into the workforce. However, when 
stratifying our matching by field of study, the results are replicated for all broader field 
groups. Although we cannot ensure that our categorization of fields of study is detailed 
enough, this suggests that mandatory internships do not even add anything beneficial to 
students’ labour market integration even in those fields with generally more problematic 
transitions into employment. 
Finally, additional attention should be given to the type and quality of mandatory 
internship programs. Not being able to differentiate between different mandatory internships 
can certainly be seen as a limitation of our data. Further evaluation of other related 
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institutional setups in higher education such as “internship managers” helping students to find 
an appropriate internship should be conducted. It should also be noted that these results do not 
necessarily question the utility of internships per se, but rather the policy of implementing 
mandatory internships into curricula. With respect to processes at labour market entry, other 
institutional settings of the education-labour market linkage specific to Germany might 
produce different findings than we would see in other countries. Beyond institutional settings, 
cultural differences and academic traditions vary considerably between countries and may 
influence the whole transition from higher education to work. To elaborate more on these 
contextual effects, an international comparison with regard to our question would certainly be 
of interest. As our results are limited to the German context, these questions have to be left 
open to further research. 
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Table 1: Criteria of selecting fields of study into the sample: Degree of implementation of mandatory 
internships into curricula and “Staatsexamen” degree 
1 
included in sample 
2 
not included in sample due to a share of non-implementation of mandatory internship <15% or “Staatsexamen-
Degree” 
 
Field of study Freq. 
 
Share mand. int. 
implemented 
 
“Staatsexamen” 
degree 
agricultural economics, nutritional science, FH
* 70 .67
1
  
architecture, spatial planning, FH 86 .87
2
  
construction engineering, application, FH 153 .86
2
  
electrical engineering, FH 217 .82
1
  
mechanical engineering, FH 421 .86
2
  
industrial engineering, FH 51 .92
2
  
computer sciences etc., FH 80 .77
1
  
economics, FH 211 .54
1
  
social work, FH 211 .94
2
  
others
1
, FH 54 .91
2
  
agricultural economics, nutritional science, university
 59 .53
1
  
architecture, spatial planning, university 60 .85
2
  
construction engineering, application, university 77 .79
1
  
electrical engineering, university 153 .95
2
  
mechanical engineering, university 294 .94
2
  
industrial engineering, university 108 .97
2
  
physics, university 171 .32
1
  
biology, university 64 .33
1
  
chemistry, university 113 .52
1
  
pharmaceutics, university 56 .95
2
 X 
mathematics, university 100 .19
1
  
computer sciences, university 146 .49
1
  
human medicine, university 242 .97
2
 X 
psychology, university 88 .98
2
  
education science, university 95 .88
2
  
linguistics, cultural studies, university 67 .67
1
  
law, university 286 .94
2
 X 
economics, university 600 .28
1
  
teaching degree for elementary school, university (of 
education)  
330 .99
2
 X 
teaching degree for lower secondary school, university 
(of education) 
80 .94
2
 X 
teaching degree for upper secondary school, university 
(of education) 
302 .94
2
 X 
“Magister” (liberal arts degree), university 386 .18
1
  
protestant theology, university 3 .00
2
 X 
catholic theology, university 2 1.00
2
 X 
arts, university 71 .20
1
  
social sciences, university 61 .13
1
  
geosciences, geography, university 101 .75
1
  
dentistry, university, university 32 .50
2
 X 
veterinary medicine, university 121 1.00
2
 X 
Notes: 
*
 FH ≙ Fachhochschule (university of applied sciences); the fields of study in bold letters are included in 
the analyses; 
1
 others refer to protestant/catholic theology, arts and librarianship 
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Table 2: Assignment model: propensity of having a mandatory internship 
field of study (ref.: linguistics, cultural studies, university)  
agricultural economics, nutritional science, FH
1 
0.564 
electrical engineering, FH 1.244
**
 
computer sciences etc., FH 0.725 
economics, FH -0.065 
agricultural economics, nutritional science, university 0.990
*
 
construction engineering, application, university -3.751
**
 
physics, university -1.537
*** 
biology, university -3.675
**
 
chemistry, university -1.717
***
 
mathematics, university -0.926 
computer sciences, university -0.217 
economics, university -0.867 
“Magister”, university -2.195** 
geosciences, geography, university 0.781 
social sciences, university -2.465
***
 
arts, university -1.956
***
 
federal state of attended post-secondary institution (1: West Germany, 0: GDR) -1.290
***
 
interaction terms of federal state and field of study  
west * physics, university 2.624
*
 
west * chemistry, university 3.540
**
 
west * economics, university -1.426
***
 
west * “Magister-degree”, university 0.485 
west * computer sciences, university -0.411 
type of eligibility to university (Abitur)
2 
(ref.: abroad)  
for all tertiary institutions -0.562 
solely for Fachhochschulen (university of applied sciences) -0.555 
federal state in which Abitur is acquired (ref.: North Germany)  
North Rhine-Westphalia -0.611
***
 
Hesse/Rhineland-Palatinate -0.499
**
 
Baden-Württemberg 0.056 
Bavaria -0.009 
East Germany 0.024 
City federal states 0.827
**
 
abroad -0.423 
not stated 0.155 
educational path to Abitur (ref.: other educational paths)  
general upper secondary school (Gymnasium) -0.452 
vocational school 0.256 
comprehensive school -1.124 
Abitur in GDR -0.212 
evening school 0.238 
adult education center -0.175 
specialized secondary school -0.947
*
 
differing vocational types -0.008 
respondents’ assessment of the study program  
degree of structuring (ref.: very good)  
good -0.277 
medium -0.426 
poor -0.257 
very poor -0.260 
time coordination of courses (ref.: very good)  
good 0.138 
medium 0.060 
poor 0.285 
very poor 0.403 
how up-to-date the acquired methods are (ref.: very good)  
good 0.047 
medium -0.107 
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poor -0.275 
very poor -0.052 
how up-to-date the imparted research knowledge is (ref.: very good)  
good -0.158 
medium 0.039 
poor 0.073 
very poor -0.050 
opportunity for professional specialization (ref.: very good)  
good -0.064 
medium -0.064 
poor -0.060 
very poor -0.008 
contact to teaching staff (ref.: very poor)  
very good -0.585 
good -0.404 
medium -0.311 
poor -0.398 
counseling and support (ref.: very good)  
good 0.100
 
medium -0.022
 
poor 0.002 
very poor -0.811
* 
discussion of exams and papers (ref.: very good)  
good 0.284 
medium 0.325 
poor 0.236 
very poor 0.213 
availability of literature in library (ref.: very poor)  
very good 0.083 
good -0.061 
medium 0.216 
poor 0.154 
access to computer system and personnel (ref.: very poor)  
very good 0.137 
good 0.109 
medium 0.303 
poor 0.095 
use of electronic means of communication (ref.: very poor)  
very good 0.687
*
 
good 0.560
*
 
medium 0.173 
poor 0.190 
respondents’ assessment of the importance of labour market perspectives  
(ref.: very unimportant) 
 
very important 0.392 
important -0.012 
medium importance -0.002 
unimportant -0.153 
individual characteristics  
year of eligibility to university 0.085 
age -0.133 
square age 0.004 
age at enrollment -0.097
*
 
Abitur grade 0.016 
female 0.215 
parents with academic degree  0.046 
N 2226 
Pseudo-R² 0.2799 
Notes: the exemplary assignment model is one out of nine and refers to all cases and the outcome job search 
duration; all reference categories are set arbitrary, as the interpretation of the assignment model is not the main 
purpose of this article. 
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1
 FH ≙ Fachhochschulen (university of applied sciences);  
2 
Abitur ≙ upper secondary school degree, equivalent to A-levels; data source: HIS graduate panel, own 
calculations 
*
 p < 0,05; 
**
 p < 0,01; 
***
 p < 0,001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 3: The ATT of mandatory internships on the transition from higher education to work  
 
 search time employment history 
complexity 
log hourly wages 
all cases    
unmatched (t-value) -1.398  (-3.43) -0.206  (-2.77) -0.054  (-3.02) 
ATT [z-value] -0.027  [-0.06] -0.091  [-0.79] -0.039  [-1.58] 
    
number of obs. -2226 -2225 -1971 
off common support
1 
-43 -43 -39 
    
parents with 
academic degree 
   
unmatched (t-value) -1.329  (-2.11) -0.061  (-0.52) -0.047  (-1.59) 
ATT [z-value] 0.245  [0.29] 0.162  [1.03] 0.006  [0.14] 
    
number of obs. -997 -996 -887 
off common support -74 -73 -46 
    
parents without 
academic degree 
   
unmatched (t-value) -1.435  (-2.68) -0.308  (-3.26) -0.066  (-2.99) 
ATT [z-value] -0.262  [-0.38] -0.087  [-0.57] -0.063  [-1.82] 
    
number of obs. -1224 -1224 -1079 
off common support -25 -25 -40 
Notes: kernel matching with Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth h=0.06; t-statistics of unmatched results in 
parentheses; z-values derived from bootstrap-standard errors of ATT in brackets (N= 500 replications); data 
source: HIS graduate panel, own calculations 
1
 “off common support” are those cases which have to be excluded from the analysis because a no case with a 
similar propensity to be in a program with mandatory internships could be found, according to our assignment 
model. In our analysis, the number of these cases can be considered as being small. 
 
